Larry Golden v. Google LLC, decided June 25, 2025
- Gary Morris
- Jul 7
- 4 min read
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Case Number: 2024-2024
Decided: June 25, 2025
Plaintiff-Appellant: Larry Golden (pro se)
Defendant-Appellee: Google LLC
I. Case Summary
This nonprecedential disposition affirms the United States District Court for the Northern District of California's decision to dismiss Larry Golden's amended complaint for patent infringement against Google LLC. Golden, a pro se litigant, asserted infringement of several of his patents related to "a chemical/biological/radiological detector unit with a disabling locking system for protecting products . . . from terrorist activity, and also for preventing unauthorized access to and tampering with the storage and transport of ordnance and weapons." The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to adequately allege infringement, a decision upheld by the Federal Circuit.
II. Key Patents and Accused Products
Larry Golden is the named inventor and applicant on U.S. Patent Nos. 10,163,287, 9,589,439, 9,096,189, and 10,984,619. These patents share common specifications and describe a detector unit for protection against terrorist activity and unauthorized access to weapons.
Golden accused Google of infringing these patents through the "makes, uses, offer[s] to sell, or sells Google Pixel smartphones 3, 3XL, 3a, 3aXL, 4a, 4a(5G), and 5," and later expanded to include newer models.
III. Procedural History
September 14, 2022: Larry Golden sued Google, alleging infringement of the ’287, ’439, and ’189 patents.
District Court's First Dismissal: Google moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to adequately allege infringement. The District Court granted the motion with leave to amend, stating it could not "say at this stage that amendment necessarily would be futile."
August 22, 2023: Golden filed an amended complaint, adding allegations related to the ’619 patent and newer Google phone models. He alleged infringement "jointly, directly, and/or indirectly . . . [or] under the ‘doctrine of equivalents’" and further contended that "Google actively encouraged the [Department of Defense/Defense Threat Reduction Agency (“DoD/DTRA”)] and Draper Laboratory Inc.’s infringement."
District Court's Second Dismissal: Google moved to dismiss the amended complaint, which the District Court granted without leave to amend.
Direct Infringement: Failed because Golden's theories required the accused products to be further modified to infringe.
Indirect Infringement: Failed due to the lack of properly alleged direct infringement.
Joint and Willful Infringement: Allegations were deemed "too conclusory to state claims, 'even applying the lenient pleading standards for pro se plaintiffs.'"
Leave to Amend: Denied as futile.
Reconsideration and Disqualification: Golden sought reconsideration and disqualification of the presiding judge, both of which were denied.
Appeal: Golden appealed to the Federal Circuit.
IV. Legal Analysis and Federal Circuit Decision
The Federal Circuit reviewed the District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, applying Ninth Circuit law and the pleading standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, which require a complaint to "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’" While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, they must still meet minimal standards.
A. Preclusive Effect of Prior Apple Decision
Golden argued that a previous Federal Circuit decision in Golden v. Apple Inc. (2022 WL 4103285), which found his complaint and claim chart "not facially frivolous," should preclude dismissal in this case.
Federal Circuit's Ruling: The court disagreed with Golden. The prior Apple decision explicitly stated that it "express[ed] no opinion as to the adequacy of [Mr. Golden’s] complaint or claim chart except that it is not facially frivolous," and that "[o]ur decision does not preclude subsequent motions to dismiss by the defendant for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment." Therefore, the Apple decision had no preclusive effect on the current dismissal.
B. Sufficiency of Infringement Allegations
Golden argued he provided enough factual allegations to show Google's smartphones infringed.
Federal Circuit's Ruling: The court agreed with Google that the District Court correctly dismissed the amended complaint for failing to state claims for direct, indirect, joint, and willful infringement.
1. Direct Infringement
The District Court and Federal Circuit found that Golden's "factual allegations plausibly show, at the most, only that [Google]-made-and-sold smartphones could be modified post-sale by others."
There was "no plausible allegation that [Google] itself is making, selling (or offering to sell), using, or importing smartphones that have the claimed detector/sensor functionality, either literally or [under the doctrine of] equivalents."
Golden's five infringement theories all required modifications to the accused Google products:
Theory 1: Required the use of the third-party app "ATAK-CIV."
Theory 2: Required the use of "NFC tags," external to Google products.
Theory 3: Required using "Google’s camera lens with [a] microfluidic lens" that "uses [a] microscope to focus on a chemical sensor."
Theory 4: Required external sensors to be added to Google's device.
Theory 5: Required "Google Beacon," a separate device.
Conclusion: All direct infringement theories failed because they necessitated modification of the accused products to show infringement.
2. Indirect and Willful Infringement
Federal Circuit's Ruling: Because Golden failed to adequately plead direct infringement by Google, his complaint also failed to sufficiently plead indirect infringement and willful infringement. "Indirect infringement, whether inducement to infringe or contributory infringement, can only arise in the presence of direct infringement."
3. Joint Infringement
Federal Circuit's Ruling: The amended complaint failed to sufficiently plead a claim for joint infringement.
A joint infringement claim requires "pleading facts sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that all steps of the claimed method are performed and either (1) one party exercises the requisite ‘direction or control’ over the others’ performance or (2) the actors form a joint enterprise such that performance of every step is attributable to the controlling party."
Golden alleged joint infringement by Google and Draper Laboratory Inc., and Google and the DoD/DTRA. However, he failed to "allege any factual allegations regarding the degree of control that Google had over Draper Laboratory Inc. or DoD/DTRA or allege any facts showing those entities formed a joint enterprise."
V. Conclusion
The Federal Circuit considered Golden's remaining arguments and found them unpersuasive. For the reasons stated, the District Court's judgment of dismissal was affirmed. No costs were awarded.




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